The Properties of Interlocking Directorates in the Philippines: An Exploratory Analysis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32871/rmrj2210.01.06Keywords:
Board interlock, interlocking directorate, network analysis, Philippines, centralityAbstract
Governance has become an increasingly important factor in the investment decisions of firms and investors. Thus, it is important to determine the quality and composition of corporate boards, which are vital overseers who act in the best interests of shareholders to improve and strengthen them. While interlocking directorates are not a recent occurrence in the Philippines, updated literature on the structure of the country’s board interlock network is sparse. Thus, this study provides a baseline snapshot by analyzing all 251 publicly-listed companies on the Philippine Stock Exchange at the director and board levels. More so, the study utilizes social network analysis tools to describe the properties of interlocking directorates and visually maps out the social network that underpins these relationships. It reveals that the board network is extensive, with almost 90% of firms connected, thanks to a handful of key directors who have high degrees of connectivity.
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