Timeless Existence and Principle of Creation: Notions Embedded in John 1:1, "In the Beginning Was the Word"

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Abstract

St. John's Gospel begins with a prologue, serving as an overture to the whole Gospel. This paper investigates the philosophical notions embedded in the first three lines of John 1:1. The inquiry focuses on whether or not the accepted meaning of this line as "indicating timeless existence" can be deduced from John 1:1 and whether or not John 1:1 also indicates the meaning of the "principle of creation." This paper proceeds to make this inquiry in the following order: Introduction; The questions arising in John 1:1; Word as God is eternal, outside time; "In the beginning" as predicate; "The Word was in the beginning"; Timeless existence and the verb was; The Word as God is a principle of creation (which included the distinction between the concepts of anthropological intentionality and metaphysical intentionality); and Conclusion. This paper concludes by affirming the two questions on timeless existence and the principle of creation.

Keywords: John 1:1, Word, beginning, timeless existence, principle of creation, intentionality

1.0 Introduction

> In the beginning was the Word;
> the Word was in God's presence,
> and the Word was God.
> (The New American Bible, 1984, Jn 1:1)

"In the beginning was the Word" -- *In principio erat Verbum* -- (Jn. 1:1). St. John opens his Gospel with this inverted sentence. This paper proposes to dwell on this single verse only and attempts to inquire into its philosophical connotations. This short text is of great interest here, for it has embedded in itself the philosophical notions of "timeless existence" and "principle of creation." In the end, this paper concludes by affirming the two philosophical notions as really embedded in this verse.

This inquiry has positive consequences. From the vantage point of religion, it could further strengthen an already existing faith in verse 1:1 of St. John's Gospel. The result of this inquiry also affirms St. Anselm's famous saying: "*Credo ut intelligam*" (I believe so that I may understand).

2.0 Methodology

This work is purely qualitative, utilizing the descriptive method. The biblical text is analyzed. In this analysis, philosophical ideas of Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and other philosophers/writers are used to support the point that I attempt to show, i.e., the philosophical connotations embedded in the said verse.

3.0 Results and Discussion

The Questions Arising in John 1:1

St. John's Gospel opens with a prologue (verses 1-18). Biblical scholars agree that this prologue was composed separately from the entire body of the Johannine Gospel. This is "a hymn formally poetic in style – perhaps originally an independent composition and only later adapted and edited to serve as an overture to the Gospel" (The New American Bible, 1984, John 1:1-18).

Verse one (1) is composite. It may be subdivided into three lines as follows: (1) "In the beginning was the Word (cf. Gen. 1:1); (2) the Word was in God's presence (cf. Prov. 8:30); and (3) the Word was God." However, I further narrow down the focus on lines one (1) and three (3). In this section, I propose to proceed in the reverse order, beginning with line three (3) back to line one (1). (The second line is not included.)

Line three (3) is a simple proposition: "The Word was God." The Greek word for God is *theos*. When *theos* is used without the article, it is said to be a predicate (The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, 1999). Thus, in line three (3) of John 1:1, the word God or *theos* is used as a *predicate*.

The idea of predication is relevant here. The science of logic deals with *propositions*, also known as *judgments*. It studies the connection of the subject and the predicate. The predicate expresses something about the subject. Immanuel Kant aptly delineates the nature of this connection. He distinguishes analytic and synthetic judgments. "Analytic judgments," Kant says, "express nothing in the predicate but what has already been thought in the concept of the subject" (Kant, 1977). It means that the nature of the subject is no more than what the predicate expresses. Kant's description of analytic judgment helps us analyze line three (3) of John 1:1.

Thus the predicate, *theos*, expresses the nature of the subject, *Word*. The subject is but the predicate; or both subject and predicate are identical. Now, the word *theos* in itself denotes the idea of *eternal* being, an ontological attribute. Therefore, as predicate, *theos* expresses the ontological attribute, *eternity*, of the subject, *Word*. It is the logical explication of line three (3) of John 1:1. Hence, "The Word was (is) God" means "The Word was (is) eternal."

Line one (1) of John 1:1 states: "In the beginning was the Word." From grammatical point of view, it is in the OVS order. For the purposes of this discussion, it shall be reconstructed to the natural SVO order: "The Word was in the beginning."

The first to consider is the verb was (is). It has two uses: (1) as a grammatical linker of the subject and the predicate, (2) as a metaphysical term, denoting existence. Thus, *"God is"* is itself a proposition; in other words, God *exists*.

The metaphysical denotation of the verb was (is) is used in the footnote of John 1:1; it is shown to connote timeless existence (The New American Bible, 1984, John 1:1-18). This connotation is the same as the ontological attribute of *theos*, i.e., eternal or eternity. Here, timeless existence and eternity are synonymous terms; they mean the same thing. *Eternity is timeless existence; timeless existence is eternity*.

Comparing line three (3): "The Word was (is) God" from line one (1): "The Word was in the beginning", these two propositions have the same subjects, Word, but they have different predicates. This is where the crucial point lies. The two predicates appear to show a contradiction in terms of the nature of the subject, *Word*. The predicate, *theos*, in line three (3), denotes an *eternal being*, a timeless existence, outside the framework of time. The predicate, *in the beginning*, in line one (1),

implies *something temporal*, within the framework of time. They appear to present two contradictory notions, *eternal* and *temporal*, in one and the same subject, *Word*.

These seeming contradictory notions pave the way for the following questions to arise. First, in line three (3), does *Word* refer to a God who is just within the framework of time? Or does *Word* merely refer to a God who is just a temporal being, having a beginning and an end?

Secondly, in line one (1), does *theos*, predicated to the subject, *Word*, really denote or express timeless existence? Or does *Word* or *theos* refer to a God who is eternal? Or does line one (1) really indicate timeless existence? Does it also indicate the principle of creation?

In this paper, I attempt to answer those questions. I propose to show that "In the beginning was the Word" contains the philosophical notions, timeless existence and principle of creation. I shall try to tackle this in the following sections.

Word as God is Eternal, Outside Time
Word is Eternal

In "The Word was (is) God," what does God mean? The traditional description of God provides the following attributes. As to God's being, God is eternal; God is immense; God is ubiquitous; God is immutable. As to God's intellect, God is omniscient; God is wise. As to God's will, God is free; God is omnipotent; God is holy. It could be said that these are the qualifications for a being to be God; otherwise, this being would not be really God at all (Glenn, 1980).

One commonly known definition, however, is that God is "the one Supreme Being, the creator and ruler of the universe" (Komonchak et al., 1991, 423). This definition implies that God is not the universe nor within the structure of the universe,

as if an elemental part of it. St. Thomas Aquinas says on this topic: "As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation" (Aquinas, n.d., Summa, Q28, Art.1, Obj.3). An example from human experience may be cited to support the validity and strength of Aquinas' argument. Rudolf Diesel invented the diesel engine. As inventor/creator of this engine, he is not the engine itself, nor within the engine, as if an essential part of it.

The created universe implies that the creator is necessarily *prior* to it and that he must be a being who himself has no beginning. Otherwise, the creature and the creator would have no distinction at all. If there is no prior eternal being as creator, then there would have been nothing in existence up to now, for there was nothing to start anything to exist. St. Thomas Aquinas argues for God's eternal, necessary existence with his famous five proofs (Wolff, 1969).

The 20th century, however, shows the emergence of the Death of God movement (Murray, 1964). It has sought not only to deny and to leave the word, God, to oblivion but also to invalidate the meaning of such a word. "Not only is it maintained that the word [i.e., the word, God] has no objective referent in reality, but that it has no real meaning for human intelligence" (Komonchak et al., 1991, 424). It means that no objective real thing in the universe serves as referent for verifying the validity of the word, God. Consequently, no conclusion can be established other than that God is meaningless to the human mind.

Yet, St. Thomas Aquinas points out that God as creator is outside the universe. Nowhere in the material universe can one literally find an objective referent of the word, God. In similar fashion, nowhere in the diesel engine can one literally find an objective referent of the man, Rudolf Diesel.

He is not the engine nor within the engine, but he factually remains as the undeniable inventor/creator of such an engine.

The material universe rather leads us back to its source, the creator. For the created reality cannot start its own existence by itself. In similar fashion, the diesel engine rather leads us back to its inventor, Rudolf Diesel. For the diesel engine cannot start its own existence by itself. The persistent claim, then, that God is meaningless merely on the basis of the natural phenomenon fails to transcend the perimeter of the physical universe. Consequently, one will never come, not even try, to reach out beyond the boundary of the material world. Thus God would remain meaningless for him. However, if suppose one will ever come to believe in a god, he would take such a god as something *a posteriori*, belonging to the created reality. Such a god fits in the humanly concocted framework, one that meaningfully fits in the human intelligence. This appears to be the trend of this era. Thus, the Death of God movement in the 20th century has lingered on till today, denying everything of God. Atheism or godlessness in the world nowadays is the evidence (Murray, 1964).

The claim that the universe simply comes into existence by itself is untenable. On the contrary, St. Thomas Aquinas has a powerful argument for the necessity of a creator. "In the world of sensible things," Aquinas says, "we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for if so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible" (Wolff, 1969). Aquinas' argument lays a big stumbling block for those who do not believe in a creator. For how can the universe, before creating itself, be prior to itself? Before the universe comes into existence, there was yet nothing in the order of created

reality. Thus, there was yet nothing to start any act of creating. How then can the universe create itself when it does not yet exist to create itself? Such a claim is plainly absurd. Therefore, the only sensible explanation is that the universe can only be started by something prior to and other than itself. In similar fashion, the only sensible explanation is that the diesel engine can only be started to exist by someone prior to and other than itself. And we know that it was Rudolf Diesel. Also, the induction motor can only be started to exist by someone prior to and other than itself. And we also know that it was Nikola Tesla.

The physicist Stephen Hawking reversed the history of the universe by tracing from the present state back to its beginning, and he arrived at what is called the theory of singularity, or the Big Bang (Hawking, 1988). He was inspired by the work of the British mathematician and physicist Roger Penrose (Ferguson, 1991). This theory holds that the universe at first is a tiny matter with infinite density. Let us say, the size of a billiard ball (using familiar analogy). This tiny matter exploded, referred to as The Big Bang. After the Big Bang explosion, the expansion of the universe began, and until now the universe is still expanding. However, there is one problem in this theory, i.e., the idea of priority. The tiny matter with infinite density must be prior to the act of the Big Bang explosion (no matter how tiny the time difference might be). No Big Bang could ever happen unless that tiny matter existed first. For if there was yet nothing, then there was yet nothing to explode. (To think inversely of the Big Bang as prior to the tiny matter is absurd.)

Let us inquire further into that tiny matter with infinite density, how does that tiny matter come to be? Science would (and in fact, could) no longer tackle this question. Suppose, however, that it tries to tackle this question and that it posits something

which is prior to that tiny matter. It would still confront the same question: how does that prior thing come to be? And this tracing back would be *ad infinitum*. Science would just stop at the Big Bang, consider it as the beginning, and dismiss the question: how does that tiny, infinitely dense matter come to be on the first place. How can then that so-called tiny matter be prior to itself in order to create itself?

What then can the mind hold as sensible explanation? PRIOR to the Big Bang, something MUST exist. One may argue that it is that tiny matter with infinite density. But still something, or a being, MUST be PRIOR to, and is responsible for, that tiny matter with infinite density. Otherwise, it is absurdity.

This PRIOR Being must be greater than, and capable of creating, the physical universe. Aristotle, the monumental thinker, conceived of this Being and called it Unmoved Mover, Uncaused Cause. The Scholastics called it GOD. This Being, or God, must be other than that so-called tiny matter in the Big Bang theory. He must have the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, holiness, eternity, etc. It can be inferred, then, that for St. John the Evangelist, this Being or God is the one referred to as: "in the beginning was the Word; and the Word was in God's presence, and the Word was God." And for the author of the Book of Wisdom, this Being is the one referred to as: "Then was I beside him as his craftsman" (Prov. 8:30, NAB, 1984).

The Big Bang theory does not disprove the necessity of the existence of the Creator; it rather necessitates the existence of the Creator.

Word is Outside Time

The concept, eternity, requires that the *Word* (God = *theos*) must be outside time. But what does outside time mean? Here, we use Aristotle's notion of time to address this question. Aristotle says, "those things therefore which are subject to perishing and becoming – generally, those which at one time exist, at another do not – are necessarily in time." He speaks of things that are inside time. In his statement, however, he also necessarily implies the opposite. That is to say, that those things that are not subject to perishing and becoming are also necessarily outside time. He further says that "plainly, things which are always are not, as such, in time, for they are not contained by time, nor is their being measured by time" (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952).

Since the material universe is subject to perishing and becoming, it is, therefore, necessarily inside time. Now, since in Jn. 1:1, the Word, as God, who is not the universe nor within the universe, is not subject to perishing and becoming, he is, therefore, necessarily outside time.

"In the Beginning" as Predicate
Temporal Meaning of "in the beginning"

The word "beginning" is used with lower case letter, *b*. This usage has some denotations: "a start, the time when anything begins, the first part." It shows that "beginning" refers to the start of something in the realm of the temporal world. The phrase "in the beginning" then must be referring to temporal reality. In contrast, the word "Beginning" with upper case letter, B, means "first cause, source, origin" (The World Book Encyclopedia Dictionary, 1964).

Kant's Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments

The verse in John 1:1 is a proposition or judgment, with subject and predicate. But, on the first place, what do analytic and synthetic modes

of predication mean? Kant clearly distinguishes analytic and synthetic judgments. I shall quote Kant himself here. I could not say it better than he does. He says:

> Analytic judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity; those in which this connection is thought without identity should be entitled synthetic. The former, as adding nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely breaking it up into those constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it. The latter adds to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it (Kant, 2003).

"In the beginning" is not Analytic but Synthetic Predicate

Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments enables us to see better the mode of predication of the verse in John 1:1. The subject, Word, is predicated with the phrase "in the beginning." We shall put again this proposition in the SVO order: "The Word was in the beginning." Now, with Kant's distinction, the predicate "in the beginning" appears to be not a part of the constituent concepts that "have all along been thought in" the subject, *Word*. For, as shown above, the subject, *Word*, is outside time, and is, therefore, eternal.

Let us suppose, however, that the predicate "in the beginning" is a part of the concept, *Word*; then the subject, *Word*, must have the nature of temporality. For the predicate "in the beginning" denotes a "start," and thus, it implies the concept of "end." In such case, the subject, *Word*, is inside time. It is thus a temporal being, belonging to the created

reality. Yet, as shown above, the *Word* is eternal, a non-temporal being. Thus, Kant's distinction helps us clarify the predicate "in the beginning" as not part of the constituent concepts of the subject, *Word*.

Furthermore, the predicate "in the beginning" does not indeed indicate the nature of the subject, *Word*. For St. John, the Word is God, and therefore, he is an eternal being. God is outside time, nor contained by time, nor measured by time, in accordance with Aristotle. But then, what does the predicate "in the beginning" rather do in the proposition? Based on Kant's distinction, it rather adds a concept that "has not been in any wise thought in" the subject, *Word*. Therefore, the phrase "in the beginning" could be seen not as analytic but rather as synthetic predicate. Consequently, "The Word was in the beginning" in John 1:1 is not an analytic but a synthetic proposition or judgment.

"The Word was in the Beginning"

The predicate "in the beginning" in Jn. 1:1 denotes something else that has a "beginning." This also prompts us to inquire what this something is referring to. So we now ask: "in the beginning" of what? This "beginning" must be referring to the beginning of the temporal reality, i.e., the creation of the world, and not referring to the subject, *Word*. And, in this beginning, the *Word* was present (The New American Bible, 1984, John. 1:1). Hence, the original proposition in John 1:1 could be expanded as follows: *"The Word was in the beginning" of the creation of the world*. Moreover, the *Word*, or *theos*, an eternal being, without beginning, presupposes that he must be prior to the temporal world.

Now, what was the role of the Word in being present in the "beginning" of the temporal world? We recall what St. Thomas Aquinas says concerning efficient causes is that the temporal world cannot

possibly start by itself. The world cannot be the efficient cause of itself, since before the world comes to be, there was yet nothing (i.e., of anything material). Thus, there was yet nothing (material) to make a start of anything (material). It is shown as absurd. Therefore, the world must have an efficient cause which is other than itself. It is the Word that St. John is referring to in verse 1:1. "The Word was in the beginning" of the creation of the world. And the role of the Word in the creation of the world is shown in Proverbs 8:30: "Then was I beside him as his craftsman." The Word takes the role of being the craftsman (τεχνίτης) in the creation of the world.

Let us get a little further into Proverbs 8:30, first, it shows that the pronoun "I" is identified with "Wisdom" (i.e., the craftsman) while the pronoun "him" is (to be) identified with God (the Father). Secondly, the word "craftsman" means a "person skilled in a particular craft." By "craft" is meant "an activity involving skill in making things by hand." Craft is an activity. Therefore, the I or Wisdom or craftsman is having an activity. Wisdom is involved in the activity of craftsmanship.

What, then, is this activity of craftsmanship referring to? This activity is referring to the "creation of the world" in the beginning as impliedly shown in John 1:1. Consequently, the *Word* (= *theos*) in John 1:1 is (to be) identified with Wisdom in Proverbs 8:30 who is the craftsman beside God. The Greek philosopher Plato refers to this craftsman as the "divine *Demiurge*, a creator who made the various things in the world by giving form to formless matter in accordance with the eternal Ideas" (Reydon, n.d.).

Moreover, both God (the Father) and the Word (the Son) in the divine activity were clearly present. Their presence is corroborated by the word "us" in Genesis 1:26, which says: "Let us create man in our image and likeness."

"Timeless Existence" and the Verb "Was"

The verb "was" is ordinarily a copula in "The Word was in the beginning." It "constitutes the formal element of the proposition and indicates whether one term is denied or affirmed of another" (Jayme, 1994). "The Word was in the beginning" is an affirmative proposition, where the predicate is formally affirmed of the subject.

The verb "was," however, could mean more than just a mere grammatical copula. It connotes the act of being (*esse*). In metaphysics, the "word *esse* expresses principally the most basic act or perfection of every being – its act of being (*actus essendi*)… we can thus say, for instance, that 'Peter is', or 'I am', or 'beings are'" (Alvira et al., 1991). The verb was, or its present form is, also connotes the act of being or the existence of the subject. The proposition in John 1:1 can be reworded thus: "The Word exists in the beginning or creation of the world." This presupposes that the Word pre-exists with respect to the creation of the world. For the world to come into existence necessarily requires a something that exists prior to it, since it cannot start existing by itself. This pre-existence in turn presupposes that the Word is outside the world, nor is the world, nor is in the world, nor is in time, nor is measured by time. Therefore, the concept *timeless existence* is embedded in John 1:1, and it can be deduced from the verb, was.

The Word as God is the Principle of Creation
"The Word was in the beginning"

"The Word was in the beginning" indicates the Word as the principle of creation. The Word, the Wisdom, the craftsman is present in the creation of the world. Now, the verse "In the beginning was the Word; the Word was in God's presence, and the Word was God" has three points: (1) that the Word was God, (2) that the Word was in the presence of

God, and (3) that the Word was in the beginning. In short, the Word was with God in the beginning or during the creation of the world. One thing is certain here: that the Word as God is quantitatively a separate being or entity, distinct from that of God, who is understood as the Father.

Logos

Word also means logos. "Logos (Hb. *dabar*; Lat. *verbum, sermo*), as it occurs in biblical and Christian theology, has the general meaning of 'word' with a family of connotations such as 'speech', 'reason', 'account'" (Komonchak et al., 1991, p.601). The Word, which is the eternal logos, is the Wisdom, the craftsman of God.

In the creation story in Genesis, God utters the words: "let there be…." And something comes into being by the words uttered by God. Thus, God makes a speech or pours out *logos*.

Intentionality

We are then prompted to ask: what do the words "*let there be…*" mean? This text appears to be connoting "intentionality" on the part of God. That is, God intends the world to be. The mind of God is directing towards something, i.e., the coming to be of the world. But does God have intentionality? If he does, is his intentionality similar to that of man's intentionality? (This is one big topic that shall be dealt with in a separate work.)

However, for the purposes of this short paper, I shall but only briefly consider this subject here. "As indicated by the meaning of the Latin word *tendere*, which is the etymology of intentionality, the relevant idea behind intentionality is that of mental directedness towards (or attending to) objects, as if the mind were construed as a mental bow whose arrows could be properly aimed at different targets" (Jacob, 2019). The mind is here visualized to be directing itself to a target. The dart game could be a good analogy. The dart represents the mind, the dartboard represents the object towards which the mind is directing itself, and the directedness of the arrow represents intentionality.

Anthropological and Metaphysical Intentionality

The phrase "mental directedness towards objects…" is important in the description of intentionality. In particular, this would refer to the intentionality in the case of man. For man's mental directedness is towards objects, either imagined or real objects, inside or outside. The object towards which the mind is directing itself is other than itself. In Franz Brentano's view – borrowing from Aristotle and Aquinas – "there is no act without an object; an empty act cannot be conscious of itself. Given the presence of the intentional content or object awakening the intentional act, then the act is directed primarily on the object" (Moran, 2000).

The intentional object, on the one hand, must be *prior* to man's intentionality or man's intentionality is *posterior* to the intentional object. Otherwise, man's intentionality would not have occurred if its target object does not exist *a priori*. For Brentano, intentionality could not occur without its object. Thus, *in the case of man, intentionality does not in any way simultaneously brings (indeed, it cannot bring) into existence the object towards which the intentionality is directed*. Here, the scholastic term "effects what it signifies" does not apply. For it "does not effect what it signifies" at the very moment of the mental act. Man's mental act or intentionality can only occur where the object is prior to intentionality, and is presented to intentionality, or the intentionality comes in contact with its correlative object. In a

general sense, man's intentionality presupposes the prior existence of the intentional object. I shall call this phenomenon as *anthropological intentionality*. That is, the intentionality in the case of man.

The intentionality, on the other hand, is different in the case of God. (I presuppose that there is intentionality on the part of God.) The phrase, "let there be…" in the Genesis story, shows to be characterized with the concept of intentionality. God's intentionality, however, is directing not towards a prior object, as in the case of man's intentionality, but towards the coming into existence of an object. The intentional object is *posterior* to God's intentionality, or God's intentionality is *prior* to the intentional object. While intentional object is *prior* to man's intentionality, God's intentionality is *prior* to the intentional object. The creation of the world is the case in point. God's intentionality is directing towards the coming *to be* of the world (since the world is yet to exist). God's intentionality is therefore characterized by priority with respect to the coming to be of the world. His intentionality occurs first, and, consequently, the created (material) object comes to be. So the phrase "let there be…" produces the very object (i.e., the world) referred to by this phrase. The scholastic term "effects what it signifies" applies here. I shall call this phenomenon as *metaphysical intentionality*. That is, the intentionality in the case of God.

The Role of the Word in the Creation of the World

God's intentionality for the coming to be of the world is but carried out by the *Word* or the *Logos*. But this *Word* or *Logos* is also God himself. This *Word* or *Logos* is the one referred to by St. John in verse 1:1: "In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." This *Word* or *Logos* is also the Wisdom, the craftsman referred to in Proverbs 8:30: "Then was I beside him as his craftsman." This *Word* or *Logos* is he who carries out the metaphysical intentionality of God (understood as the eternal Father) in the coming to be of the world. The role, then, of the *Word* or *Logos* is his being the craftsman or the designer of the world. Using Heidegger's terminology, we may say that the *Word* or *Logos* brings the material world into "presence," a "revealing" or a "presencing" – *Anwesen* – (Heidegger, 1977).

Furthermore, the word "us" in the verse "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness" in Genesis denotes plurality. At least, quantitatively, two substantial Beings are present, designated as the Father and the Son. God (the Father) has the metaphysical intentionality for the coming to be of the world. But the *Word* or *Logos* (the Son) is the one who carries out such metaphysical intentionality of God (the Father). This *Word* or *Logos* is what St. John refers to when he says: "through him all things came into being, and apart from him nothing came to be" (The New American Bible, 1984, John 1:3) Therefore, the *Word*, the eternal *Logos*, the Wisdom, the craftsman was in God's presence in the beginning, or in the creation of the world. The *Word*, therefore, is the very *principle of creation* of anything that comes into being.

4.0 Conclusion

The abstract of this paper points out two things for inquiry. In this brief conclusion, I affirm that, first, the verb "was" really denotes timeless existence, the act of being of the Word. It indicates the Word's pre-existence or existence prior to the existence of the world. Secondly, I affirm also that the Word is truly the principle of creation. The Word, the eternal

Logos, is the Wisdom, the craftsman who carries out God's metaphysical intentionality for the coming to be of the world. Thus, the proposition "The Word was in the beginning" in John 1:1 truly has embedded the philosophical concepts of *timeless existence* and *principle of creation*.

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